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The search for an answer to why some nations develop,
modernize, and enjoy rapid economic growth while other
nations lag behind or even decline is the most classic and
recurrent issue confronting students of development. Without
disregard for the significant theoretical contributions this
enigma has elicited from social scientists, there may still be
merit in a more modest and incremental approach to the
problem. Instead of framing the question in terms of why
some nations &dquo;take off&dquo; while others do not, an understand-
ing of development may be equally advanced by asking why
country A did better than country B in implementing a
specific program. The answer may not produce such theoret-
ical constructs as &dquo;need for achievement,&dquo; &dquo;withdrawal of
status respect,&dquo; and &dquo;stages of economic growth,&dquo; but it does
direct attention to fundamental issues and building blocks of
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the development process that are often slighted in the quest
for holistic explanations (see McClelland, 1961; Hagen, 1962;
Rostow, 1960).
The primary objective of the present paper is to compare
and analyze the organized government efforts by India and
Pakistan to curtail population growth through family plan-
ning programs (for a useful comparison of agricultural
programs in India and Pakistan which attempts to analyze
and explain performance differentials in another field, see
Falcon and Gotsch, 1968). The analysis will attempt to
indicate the properties of each country’s political system and
development strategy that qualitatively influence program
performance in family planning. Implicit in this analysis is
the view that the effective implementation of a development
program depends in large measure on nonprogrammatic
variables external to the specific organization charged with
responsibility for program management. The major points
made within the paper are: (1) Pakistan has been relatively
more effective in implementing its family planning program
than has India; (2) the higher rate of family planning
acceptance in Pakistan cannot be explained satisfactorily in
terms of the sociological-demographic characteristics of the
two populations; (3) the differential in family planning
performance between the countries is more directly a
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consequence of a combination of administrative and political
factors which are also related to each country’s economic
policies and political system; and (4) the political and
administrative characteristics which enabled Pakistan to carry
out its family planning program more effectively were also
properties of Pakistan’s political system, which contributed
to the forced resignation of President Ayub in March 1969,
and to the political chaos that followed.
THE INTRODUCTION OF FAMILY PLANNING
IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
In 1951, India acquired the distinction of being the first
nation in the world to adopt an official family planning
policy aimed at reducing the rate of population growth
through fertility control. While family planning was being
encouraged by voluntary associations in Pakistan during the
1950s, it was not until 1960-almost a decade after India-
that the government of Pakistan made fertility control a
matter of public policy. Despite the relatively early commit-
ment of the two governments to family planning, both
nations only began to translate earlier policy pronounce-
ments into serious programmatic activities in 1965, when a
series of economic, international, and technological develop-
ments converged to provide a new impetus to family
planning.
Developing nations became aware early in the 1960s that
the period optimistically labeled the &dquo;development decade&dquo;
would constitute, at best, ten years of modest economic
growth and even more modest growth in per capita GNP. The
burden of supporting a population growing at a rate of about
2.5% a year required that a significant portion of GNP be
divered from investment and social development to meet the
needs of population increase. Even a significant annual
increase in GNP, as Pakistan achieved in the mid-1960s,
became far less impressive when translated into per capita
GNP. Moreover, the rate of population growth in India and
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Pakistan turned out to be higher than either country had
expected. The results of the Indian census of 1961 produced
great concern among planners, because it indicated that
during the ten preceding years population growth was 30
million more than had been expected (Simmons, 1971:
181 ).’ In Pakistan, official population growth estimates
based on the 1961 1 census appear significantly understated
when contrasted with the findings of several subsequent
studies in which population growth data were gathered with
greater care (Bean, 1971 ; Hardee and Satterthwaite, 1970:
1-2).
It was clear that India and Pakistan had a population
problem; yet, the presence of a problem may have little to do
with whether the political machinery of that society recog-
nizes and responds to the problem. In the mid-1960s,
however, both India and Pakistan had competent personnel
occupying high government positions who recognized the
implications of the demographic trend in their countries and,
more important, who had access to the centers of political
power and decision-making if they were not decision makers
themselves. These included the leaders of the Planning
Commissions in both countries, as well as a number of senior
administrators and technicians in ministries directly con-
cerned with development.
Those in India and Pakistan who were stressing the
importance of population as a factor in economic develop-
ment received help for their cause from another direction in
1965. By then, international agencies and donor countries
were evincing concern over the efforts of India and Pakistan
in the family planning field. Foreign and international
agencies began urging the two countries to devote greater
resources to curtailing fertility and indicated their willingness
to provide technical and financial assistance to that end
(Lewis, 1970).’ Adoption and implementation of a family
planning program were being viewed internationally as a
prime indicator of each country’s commitment and capacity
to face up to the tough obstacles of development.
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In addition to a heightened awareness of the economic
costs of population growth, the role of planners and technical
experts in influencing policy, and international concern, if
not pressure, to encourage government action, no develop-
ment was more significant in making 1965 the landmark year
for family planning than the introduction of a new contra-
ceptive technology known as the intrauterine contraceptive
device (IUD). For years, those concerned with rapid popula-
tion growth and the need for family planning had been
looking for a contraceptive that was easily administered,
inexpensive, reversible, and medically safe, and that did not
require daily or repeated action on the part of the user
(Balfour, 1962). Many believed the IUD possessed more of
the characteristics of an ideal contraceptive than any method
previously available. It was regarded as particularly appro-
priate for the developing nations, where the lack of medical
personnel and distribution systems and weak motivation on
the part of potential users magnified the liabilities of the
conventional contraceptives which had been the mainstay of
their early family planning clinics.’
Prior to its adoption by the Indian and Pakistani family
planning programs, the IUD has been tried on an experi-
mental basis in numerous countries. The extensive reports
and statistical analyses of its effectiveness, acceptance, and
side effects were favorable (Segal et al., 1964).4 Although a
more cautious and judicious analysis of this trial program
indicates that the IUD is somewhat less than the &dquo;ideal&dquo;
contraceptive and possesses its own inherent liabilities, family
planning leaders, including medical doctors, were prone to
gloss over the deficiencies of the IUD and to overstate its
positive qualities.
The initial enthusiasm and optimism that accompanied this
innovation in contraceptive technology has had enduring
organizational implications for the population programs of
India and Pakistan. For the first time, the two countries
approached the population question confident that appro-
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priate technology was available for their own societies. They
reacted by setting ambitious goals of fertility reduction, by
making population policy a prominent feature of their
development goals, and by increasing the size, resources, and
even the authority of their family planning organizations.
When it was later realized that the IUD was not the ideal
contraceptive that would enable the two countries to sharply
curtail fertility rates in a matter of years, each country was in
a sense saddled with its own policy pronouncements,
publicized goals, and family planning organizations. It was
now too late to withdraw gracefully from these commit-
ments. Each country, therefore, had to pursue its own goals
with imperfect contraceptive technologies. India had never
relied exclusively on the IUD, not because of Indian
prescience but because of the difficulty of making a decision
that would apply uniformly throughout India. While Pakistan
relied exclusively on the IUD for several years, by 1968 it
was stressing sterilization as well. Ironically, if it had not
been for the unreal expectations attributed to the IUD,
neither country probably would have vested the resources
and manpower in family planning that it did in 1965. Thus,
large-scale family planning programs got under way in each
country in 1965, though by 1970 evidence was mounting
that Pakistan had been significantly more effective than
India in implementing its program.
COMPARATIVE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE
Prior to an examination of why the two national programs
differed in their performance, it is appropriate to consider
the question of whether a differential actually existed.
Serious and legitimate questions have been raised about the
reliability of performance data in both countries (see, e.g.,
Bean, 1971); moreover, even if the reports on insertions of
IUDs and sterilization operations were accurate, these are at
best only a crude indication of program effectiveness. Without
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information about the age, parity, and prior contraceptive
practices of the adopter, as well as the retention rates of the
IUD, it is impossible to accurately assess the demographic
effectiveness of a family planning program in preventing
births or reducing the fertility rates (for a further discussion
of the problems of evaluating family planning programs, see
Berelson, 1969; Seltzer, 1970). In the absence of reliable data
for these variables on a nationwide basis, the present analysis
had had to rely upon what may be designated as intermediate
indicators-tne number of reported IUD insertions and
sterilization operations performed.
As a criterion of relative administrative effectiveness,
however, this measure seems justifiable, for the major
organizational efforts of both programs in the years under
examination have been aimed at the dissemination of these
two contraceptive techniques. Further, the fragmentary
evidence that exists concerning the demographic effectiveness
of the two programs as well as the opinions of those who
have observed both programs firsthand do not challenge the
appropriateness of the intermediate indicators as being
roughly representative of the relative accomplishments of
India and Pakistan in family planning.’
The comparison of the two programs shown in Figures I
and 2 is based on the cumulative number of IUD insertions
and sterilization operations standardized to a rate per 1,000
total population for each country. As indicated graphically in
Figure I, India first introduced the IUD into its family
planning program in early 1965. After a promising start, the
Indian program leveled off and soon began to decline. Peak
monthly performance for IUD acceptance occurred from
October 1965 to March 1966, during which time an average
of about 100,000 insertions took place each month. Since
then, however, the IUD adoption rate has gradually but
consistently gone down, and by 1970 the monthly average
was about 40,000 insertions. The cumulative rate reached
only 6.2 insertions per 1,000 by April 1970.
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The operational stage of Pakistan’s IUD program started
about six months after India had launched its IUD effort.
Notwithstanding India’s brief lead during the 1965-1966
period, Pakistan has experienced a consistently higher annual
rate of IUD insertions (see Figure 1). By April 1970, its
cumulative rate of insertions was 22.4 per 1,000-more than
three-and-one-half times the rate the Indian program had
achieved.
The magnitude of this difference may be partially attributed
to Pakistan’s choice of the IUD as its exclusive contraceptive
technology. While India stressed the IUD as its primary con-
traceptive technology, most family planning centers continued
to employ a limited &dquo;cafeteria approach&dquo; whereby health per-
sonnel or patients had some choice in contraceptive method.
The sterilization performance of the two countries (as shown
in Figure 2) reveals a pattern, however, which challenges the
assumption that Pakistan’s success with the IUD was simply a
result of concentrating its resources in one technology. Steri-
lization as a form of fertility control was introduced into the
Indian national family planning strategy as early as 1957 in
some parts of the country. The cumulative acceptance rate of
sterilization had not climbed beyond one per 1,000 by 1964.
Sterilization was given greater emphasis, however, in the revi-
talized family planning program of 1965, and its importance
as a contraceptive technology continued to increase during
the next four years. By April 1970, India had achieved a
cumulative rate of 13.5 sterilizations per 1,000 (mainly male
sterilizations or vasectomies).
Pakistan, on the other hand, did not begin to perform
sterilizations until 1966, and then only on a very limited
basis. Family planning leaders in Pakistan had mistakenly
assumed that sterilization was not an acceptable method of
fertility control in Muslim Pakistan, and they were therefore
reluctant to give it programmatic emphasis. The level of
performance after one year of experience with sterilization in
Pakistan was so low that by the end of the year the rate of
acceptance was still below that attained by India a full nine
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years earlier (see Figure 2). In a turn of events unanticipated
by program administrators in Pakistan, sterilization accep-
tance rates in East Pakistan showed a marked upward surge.
This phenomenon-in which West Pakistan participated only
belatedly and to a much lesser extent-resulted in a level of
monthly performance in Pakistan during the latter half of
1968 equal to the current sterilization rate of India. In less
than four years, the cumulative sterilization rate for East
Pakistan ( 13.3 per 1,000) had reached the national average
for all of India. The cumulative rate for all Pakistan by March
1970, however, still lagged behind the Indian level as a result
of West Pakistan’s poorer performance.
In summary, India had a head start in its sterilization
program, but since 1968, Pakistan has experienced the same
annual rate of growth in its cumulative sterilizations per
1,000 population. Within a few months after the inception of
IUD programs in both countries, Pakistan began to exhibit a
consistently higher level of performance. By combining the
performance rates for both IUDs and sterilizations, Pakistan
still demonstrates an impressive advantage with a cumulative
rate of 30.3 acceptors per 1,000 population, compared to a
combined cumulative rate of 19.7 per 1,000 in India.
THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
Pakistan’s relatively superior program performance was
accomplished, moreover, without any of the natural advan-
tages that frequently explain variation between national
family planning programs (see, e.g., Berelson, 1969). In fact,
the variables that would be most likely to have predictive
value favored India: the Indian government officially recog-
nized population growth as a serious national problem and
began organizing a family planning program several years
before Pakistan; India had comparatively more and better
trained doctors, administrators, and technical personnel to
carry out its program; India had a more extensive and highly
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developed health system, including local clinics, through
which to reach its target population; and, finally, the Indian
population seemed more sociologically &dquo;ready&dquo; to adopt
measures of fertility control.
Generally speaking, the fertility level of a society-as well
as the propensity of the population to practice family
planning-is highly correlated with a set of variables that are
subsumed under the term modernization (for a theoretical
and an empirical discussion of this point, see, respectively,
Davis, 1963; Rosen and Simmons, 1971). The social and
demographic variables associated with family planning adop-
tion provide no basis for anticipating the higher level of
acceptance that the Pakistan program has enjoyed. A
consideration of relevant sociological characteristics shows
either no significant difference between India and Pakistan or
one that tends to support the hypothesis that the Indian
program should have found a more responsive clientele. More
specifically, India has a higher percentage of its people
residing in urban areas, a higher literacy rate among women
as well as men, at greater percentage of school-age children
actually attending schools, and a higher ratio of roads, radios,
cinemas, and energy consumption per capita. Per capita
income in the two countries is roughly the same (in rupees)
as are the basic demographic characteristics pertaining to life
expectancy and infant mortality (data were compiled mainly
from United Nations documents).
Another difference between India and Pakistan which is
sociologically significant in its relationship to fertility levels
and family planning adoption is the status of women in the
two societies. Because Pakistan is a Muslim society, there is a
greater degree of female &dquo;confinement&dquo; than in India.
Muslim societies everywhere, including Pakistan, generally
impose more severe restrictions upon women than do
non-Muslim societies. As a result, Muslim women are less
likely to engage in social or occupational activities outside
the household. The greater the degree of female confinement
in a society, the greater the likelihood of high fertility. Thus,
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Muslim nations generally have higher fertility rates than do
non-Muslim nations and, in the same area, Muslim commun-
ities have a generally higher birth rate than do non-Muslim
communities (Yaukey, 1961: Kirk, 1966). In summary,
average family size in Pakistan is found to be larger than in
India and is accompanied by a combination of sociological
characteristics which historically have been correlated with
higher fertility and less use of contraceptive techniques.
The higher parity of women in Pakistan constitutes,
however, an important variable which has been linked in a
different manner to family planning adoption. Research
investigations have found that within nations or communities
one of the best predictors of family planning adoption is the
number of living children in a family (Berelson, 1969; see
also Maudlin, 1965). Thus, while for a given parity, Indian
women would seem more likely to adopt family planning, a
somewhat greater proportion of Pakistani women are at
higher parities. This factor alone, however, is not sufficient to
explain the difference in the performance of the Indian and
Pakistani family planning programs, especially when con-
sidered in conjunction with other sociological factors which
suggest, if anything, that the Indian population would be
more receptive to planned fertility control.
Emphasis on the unique or distinct characteristics of each
country may obscure the fact that India and Pakistan have
more in common than do almost any other two developing
nations. They are both basically peasant societies and have
shared the same cultural and colonial heritages for centuries.
In order to discover reasons for the differing levels of success
in their family planning programs, it may be more promising
to explore the programs themselves and the political and
administrative environment in which they operate.
EARLY EFFORTS AND THE RESPONSE TO
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The mid-1960s were a critical period for family planning
efforts in India and Pakistan. It was in 1965 that the two
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countries began in earnest to attack the population problem.
In that year, they expanded their family planning programs,
introduced the IUD as their primary contraceptive tech-
nology, and set highly ambitious performance goals. For a
comparative understanding of the two programs, it is not
sufficient to be concerned only with developments since
1965. The earlier experiences of the two programs shaped
their later organizational characteristics and largely deter-
mined the place of family planning in the broader political
and administrative systems.
India first announced a specific family planning target
during the period of its Third Five-Year Plan, 1961-1966.
The goal was to reduce the birth rate from a designated
(although uncertain) level of 41 per 1,000 to 25 per 1,000.
The third plan thus witnessed a marked acceleration in family
planning efforts and expenditures, reflecting India’s nominal
commitment to curtail population growth, but also reflecting
the characteristic gap between plans and actions. Despite the
impressive increase in expenditures over the previous plan
period, actual expenditures remained below fifty percent of
the budgetary allocation for family planning (Demerath,
1967).
In many respects, the most important decision made by
the Indian government in this period was to leave unchanged
the designation of family planning as a &dquo;health&dquo; subject, a
seemingly reasonable determination, but one which has had
far-reaching implications for the Indian program up to the
present time. Although the policy impetus for family
planning in India resulted from concern over the effect of
rapid population growth on economic development, family
planning had been associated historically with the provision
of health care for mothers and children. One of the many
responsibilities of a traditional maternal and child health
service was providing family planning advice, usually only
upon request. Thus, when the government of India decided
to move actively in the family planning field, it simply
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followed convention by viewing family planning as an aspect
of health. An alternative choice could have been made at the
time, but it was politically and administratively convenient to
leave family planning under health. This decision has had
three major consequences for the strategy, structure, and
quality of performance of family planning in India.
The first consequence of the decision was that it placed
the family planning program squarely in the Health Ministry.
Despite the importance most developing nations attach to
health, health ministries are not powerful ministries in the
competition for resources within the government. The Health
Ministry in India has never been headed by a person with an
independent political base capable of successfully vying for
financial, administrative, and political support with ministries
and programs considered vital to India’s economic growth
such as agriculture or industrial development. Moreover, the
decision to place the family planning program in the Health
Ministry denied it an opportunity to acquire a distinct
organizational identity, including the degree of command
over its own resources associated with being an independent
agency. Family planning became, instead, another claimant-
and not a strong one, initially-for resources within the
Health Ministry in competition with the traditional health
services that were more consistent with the values of the
medical profession and in greater demand with the client
population. Family planning was, in effect, a minor part of a
weak ministry headed by doctors whose professional orienta-
tion led them to see fertility control as a personal health
question rather than as a national social objective. In the
assessment of John P. Lewis (1970: 18), a student of Indian
development as well as former U.S. AID Mission Director,
It left family planning lodged in what, in the eyes of most
observers, remains one of the weakest functional cadres in the
Indian administrative system-most hesitant in effecting expe-
ditious bureaucratic clearances, most subservient to the finance
ministry overlords who pre-audit its operations-and one in which
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enervating frictions between administrative [generalists] and
technical [medical] personnel already were a long standing
tradition.
Furthermore, the Indian program was granted no extraor-
dinary status and functioned under the same personnel and
finance regulations as applied to all other Indian government
agencies. The combination of financial and personnel con-
straints characteristic of the Indian system has led to lengthy
delays in spending funds, an inability to hire needed personnel
at an appropriate staff level, and a generally undermanned
professional staff at the national level. The program conforms
in its administrative structure to the conventional model
found in other Indian ministries, and even the capable
personnel of the Indian Civil Service, accustomed to no other
administrative model or structure, failed to recognize the
program’s manpower deficiencies in numerous professional
and administrative areas. 6 Although family planning as a
health subject is the constitutional responsibility of the
states, the ministry could have made more significant
contributions if it had been able to attract the right personnel
in sufficient numbers at an appropriately high level in the
organization.’ 7
When the IUD was introduced into the Indian Family
Planning Program in 1965, it held promise of being the first
contraceptive technology with a reasonable prospect of
successful utilization in a low-income rural society. But by
that time, family planning had become
(a) firmly entrenched in the Health Ministry, under the supervision
of doctors;
(b) a program within the Health Ministry without high status, in
part because of earlier dependence on inadequate technologies;
(c) a program which many officials throughout the Indian govern-
ment perceived as symbolic rather than one that the government
intended to implement vigorously.
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In effect, India’s early start proved to be a disadvantage
rather than an advantage.
In the light of subsequent developments, it might be
expected that Pakistan’s initial efforts in the field of family
planning would stand out in sharp contrast to those of India.
Actually, the earlier years of Pakistan’s program parallel
those of India in terms of weak commitment, an inadequate
technology, a health-dominated approach, and modest ex-
penditures. What is of greater significance is that Pakistan’s
program officially started in 1960, almost ten years after
India’s, and the program simply had less time to acquire
those organizational attributes that would eventually prove
to be handicaps. Between 1960 and 1964, of almost 25
million rupees committed to family planning programs by
Pakistan’s Second Five-Year Plan, only slightly more than 9
million rupees had been spent (Adil, 1966: 127). By most
conventional measurements, Pakistan’s performance in this
period was not impressive: acceptance rates were low; clinics
were poorly utilized; and the training of new personnel was
below expectations.
A series of developments in the program eventually proved
crucial, however, in enabling Pakistan’s program to achieve a
high performance level in subsequent years. Between 1960
and 1964, with the financial support and technical assistance
of foreign agencies and universities, Pakistan established a
number of centers designed to train family planning per-
sonnel, conduct population research, and carry out program
evaluation.
The most significant transformation was an outgrowth of
Pakistan’s thorough involvement and participation in the
field-testing and evaluation of the IUD. Pakistan’s relation-
ship to the worldwide program of the IUD evaluation stands
in contrast to India’s relative detachment. Pakistan followed
up its experimental phase of the program by organizing a
large-scale &dquo;demonstration&dquo; to disseminate the new tech-
nology. Indicative of the determination and even optimism
[275]
that began to permeate the program, the Commissioner of
Family Planning, Enver Adil (1965), proclaimed that &dquo;family
planning is essentially [an] administrative and not a clinical
program.&dquo;
At the time of the introduction of the IUD in Pakistan in
1964, the Pakistani family planning program, while in the
Ministry of Health, had not been there long enough to
become an institutionalized component of it. Unlike India,
Pakistan’s brief experience with conventional contraceptive
technologies prior to the IUD had not induced in the
program a pervasive atmosphere of pessimism or skepticism.
With the advent of new technology, it thus would be
relatively easier in Pakistan to detach the program from the
Health Ministry and reorganize it in a manner that would be
compatible with the IUD as a method of family planning.
Based on the optimism of initial reports of the efficacy of
the IUD, and with the strong support of President Ayub,
plans were formulated for the National Family Planning
Scheme to commence in July 1965. During the year
preceding the inauguration of the new scheme, expenditures
far in excess of all previous family planning funding levels
were utilized, and many more personnel were trained and
hired to prepare for the major effort. At that time, the
program was organized as an autonomous entity only
nominally within the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Social
Welfare. Since then it has been independent for administra-
tive purposes from the health services and has been granted
an extraordinary degree of freedom in controlling its own
budget and personnel policies. The Family Planning Council
has been authorized to hire its own personnel without going
through the lengthy procedures to which other agencies are
subject and to establish a salary structure for its employees
higher than that generally paid government servants. The
employees of the family planning organization have never
been brought into the conventional government services; they
have enjoyed the benefits of employment and, for some, a
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higher level of income, but they can also be more easily
dismissed than regular civil servants. The combination has
been a strong incentive to effective performance.
STATE AND DISTRICT-LEVEL ADMINISTRATION
The second major consequence of India’s decision to
declare family planning a health subject was that it became
the primary responsibility of the Indian states rather than of
the central government. The Indian Constitution provides for
a federal system and specifies the subjects for which the
states are responsible-one of which is health. Consequently,
the central government in New Delhi has been severely
limited in the actions it can independently carry out with
regard to family planning on a national level. The central
government cannot require the states to implement family
planning programs, nor can it hire the requisite personnel to
work in states that show little initiative on their own. It can
only make funds available, offer to train personnel, and
provide guidelines for action; the actual implementation of
the program is dependent upon the willingness of the states
to act, and the states have not been uniformly disposed to
accept family planning as a high-priority program. Thus, the
center may appropriate funds, but these appropriations may
be underspent by the states. The center may conduct
research on various contraceptive technologies and make
recommendations, but the states may ignore these recom-
mendations and utilize any family planning method they
prefer.
Finally, although the district is probably the critical level
of government for the family planning program, officials at
the central Ministry of Health have been obliged to work
through the states in their dealings with the districts, rather
than render advice, support, and service to the districts
directly. Furthermore, the Family Planning Officer assigned
to a district is largely dependent on the staff and facilities
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under the supervision of the District Health Officer, a
medical doctor, and, consequently, the conflicts-and advan-
tages-of the organizational integration of health and family
planning obtain at all levels of the program.
Pakistan’s system has been far more simple, direct, and
semmingly effective for purposes of carrying out a family
planning program. Instead of being required to respect the
constitutional powers of seventeen diverse states, the Central
Family Planning Council has had to be concerned with only
two provinces, both of which have been highly responsive to
its direction. Although the provinces have had legal authority
over the programs, they have been, in effect, cooperative
instruments of a unified program, not only in accepting
policy direction, but also in appropriating funds.
Under President Ayub, the Pakistani program introduced a
significant degree of decentralization at the district level in
order to permit flexibility in responding to local needs, a
feature of the program noted and endorsed by the UN
evaluation team in 1969 (United Nations, 1969b: 22). The
nominal head of family planning in each district is the
Deputy Commissioner, who serves as chairman of the District
Family Planning Board. In Pakistan, as in India, the Deputy
Commissioner is by far the most powerful administrative
position within a district. The Deputy Commissioner has an
authoritative hand in almost every governmental program
carried out within his district: he can give high priority to
certain programs and ignore others, and he is a member of
the nation’s most prestigious administrative cadre. His pro-
motion and future depend to a great extent on how his
superiors evaluate him in an annual confidential report. As
one of the responsibilities assigned to the Deputy Commis-
sioner is family planning, the director of the national
program has the authority to include in a Deputy Commis-
sioner’s annual confidential report an evaluation of his work
in carrying out the district family planning program.’ As a
result, the program at the district level was administratively
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supported as well as led by the Deputy Commissioner, who
assured coordination with other ongoing programs in the
district. Pakistan’s program leadership could thus make
decisions relative to such matters as personnel, finances,
contraceptive technology, and local organization, and be
reasonably confident that the two provinces as well as
subunits of government would attempt to implement these
decisions. Unlike the Indian family planning program, Pak-
istan’s program was able to maintain regular and direct
relations with the districts. District and lower-level officials
recognized that Enver Adil, Ayub’s Commissioner of Family
Planning, functioned under a powerful presidential mandate,
which greatly enhanced his influence in the districts. In
addition, as a senior member of the Civil Service of Pakistan,
Adil was often dealing with more junior members of the same
elite administrative cadre.
Finally, the task of program direction was facilitated by a
management information and feedback system that alerted
the leadership to problems and deficiencies in program
implementation. The national ministry had established a
Central Evaluation Unit within each province which per-
formed detailed and technical examinations of each district’s
family planning program. This procedure permitted the head
of the national program to obtain directly from the local .
level certain types of information significant for policy and
managerial purposes. Each province, moreover, maintained a
research complex which served as an additional source of
information about program activities. The national govern-
ment also sent an inspection team to visit each district in
Pakistan on a quarterly basis. These visits lasted for four or
five days at a time and involved an evaluation of the family
planning program with attention to the program’s relation-
ship to other administrative and developmental programs in
the district. Both the evaluation units and the inspection
teams were important ways by which Commissioner Adil
&dquo;kept on top of developments in each district.&dquo;9 9
[279]
DELIVERY OF FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES
A third consequence which followed from India’s initial
decision to declare family planning a health subject was that
the program was organized in conjunction with its health care
delivery system. Most contraceptive technologies require the
services of medical personnel and also require a high and
sustained level of motivation on the part of the user. Under
these conditions, the Indian family planning program would
have been expected to build an organization with a signifi-
cant &dquo;outreach&dquo; component-extension agents, field workers,
health educators-and a strong communication and informa-
tion section. In its early years, however, instead of utilizing
outreach techniques or the extension approach, the Indian
program depended on a strategy of attracting clients by
offering medical and contraceptive services at an expanded
number of health clinics serving in a dual capacity as family
planning clinics. With a superior contraceptive technology
and a population motivated to curtail its fertility, this clinic
system would have been appropriate. These conditions did
not prevail, however, and the clinic system as it was then
implemented in India was manifestly inadequate.
In 1963, the government attempted to reorganize the
program in an effort to &dquo;emphasize extension education,
greater availability of contraceptive supplies, and less de-
pendence upon the traditional clinical approach&dquo; (Demerath,
1967: 184). India’s failure to implement this new plan was
underscored in 1965 by two different evaluation reports, one
by a United Nations (1966) team, and the other by an
evaluation group of the Indian Planning Commission ( 1965).
In subsequent years, the program continued to rely mainly
upon the existing health care system to administer and
implement family planning in addition to the other services it
was already performing.
Pakistan’s program, although once part of the health
system, has avoided exclusive or primary dependence on the
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health services, while at the same time utilizing the health
structure to achieve its goals. No less than the Indian family
planning program, the Pakistani program has also required
the services of medical personnel and health clinics. 1 lather
than integrating the administrative aspects of family planning
with health, however, Pakistan has vested authority and
responsibility for the program in a more dynamic and
independent structure. 1 1 As a result, the program can
capitalize on the special resources of the health services by
providing them with funds to carry out family planning
activities. The program, however, is not exclusively depen-
dent on the health services: it can work out similar financial
arrangements with other governmental as well as nongovern-
mental agencies to perform other functions; it can compen-
sate and utilize private physicians, indigenous midwives, and
various paramedical personnel for rendering family planning
services; and it can grant monetary rewards on almost a
piecework basis to personnel, including those already em-
ployed by the government, for their contributions to the
program.
If the programmatic decisions and organizational arrange-
ments described in the preceding pages explain the qualitative
differences between the two programs, it seems legitimate to
ask why India did not make similar decisions and develop a
comparable organization. Why did India designate family
planning as a health subject? Why did India depend on its
health delivery system rather than taking advantage of
alternative structures and personnel when possible? Why did
India not find more expeditious and efficient ways of adding
money and personnel to its family planning program? These
questions cannot be answered by attributing the Pakistan
formula to superior administrative know-how, to a higher
level of demographic competence, or even to greater wisdom
on the part of Pakistan’s political and administrative leaders.
India surely equalled and perhaps surpassed Pakistan in those
human resources needed to carry out developmental pro-
grams, including family planning.
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The answer should be sought elsewhere-namely, in the
politics and national development strategies that prevailed in
the two countries.
POLITICS AND THE PLANNING PROCESS
Despite variations in the economic models and the sectoral
priorities adopted by India and Pakistan, they have both
established rapid economic growth as their paramount
objective. The pervasive scarcity in both countries serves as a
constant reminder to politicians, planners, and bureaucrats
that without economic growth the eloquently expressed
ideals and aspirations of their leaders will remain beyond
reach of the people. Reflecting this need, each five-year plan
has set forth a series of development goals and spelled out
economic programs and policies designed to achieve them. In
this sense, then, India and Pakistan share common develop-
ment strategies. The difference in development strategy
between India and Pakistan is not a result of planning goals as
much as a result of the planning process and its relationship
to each country’s political system.
Policy formulation in India is subject to the restraints and
demands of diverse groups and elements in the society.
Economic development objectives are tempered by the
intervention of the political sector, which requires them to
reflect values other than economic growth such as social
welfare and more equal distribution of wealth. In effect,
economic planning in India is politicized; it is subject to the
public scrutiny, debate, bargaining, and compromise that
characterize Indian politics. While the Indian government
makes no pretense that plans are formulated by popular
referendum, it has not attempted to isolate the planning
process from the pressures of democratic political life. A. H.
Hanson (1968: 26), an astute analyst of Indian planning,
confirms this view:
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The techniques of planning that the [Planning] Commission
employs, which involve wide consultation and extensive pub-
licity, provide opportunities for the effective exertion of a variety
of organized pressures. This is advantageous to the extent that the
pressures can be absorbed, or that the people exerting them can
be persuaded to accept compromises. It is disadvantageous to the
extent that the Commission is compelled to diverge from
economic rationality, to raise hopes doomed to frustration, and
to seek fictitious &dquo;agreement.&dquo; ... Both the advantages and
disadvantages, however, are the essence of any planning in a
political order based on conciliation.
The Indian political system has held together despite the
severity of its nation-building crises because conciliation has
become institutionalized at critical points in the system. The
Indian political system continues to function and retain its
democratic character because it has recognized its own
limitations and has not strained its capacity to mobilize for
development at the risk of violating or alienating major
segments of the society. State governments, parliamentary
bodies, and opposition parties must be reckoned with in the
formulation of economic plans and development strategy.
This, in part, explains the continued legitimacy accorded the
Indian political system by its people, as well as the rate and
direction of Indian development.
Pakistan’s development strategy and the process by which
it is formulated is also an expression of the country’s politics
and influence patterns. But politics and the distribution of
influence in Pakistan differ from India. To appreciate these
differences and their origins, consideration must be given to
Pakistan’s political history since independence in 1947,
which, compared to India, has been more erratic, disjointed,
and susceptible to extraconstitutional political upheaval.
General Ayub Khan’s seizure of political power in 1958
signified for many that for the first time Pakistan had a
political leader strong enough to get things done, or, as Ayub
himself phrased it, &dquo;to clear up the mess&dquo; (Pye, 1966: 369).
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General Ayub’s task of providing Pakistan with firm political
leadership and moving the nation into a more promising
development orbit was facilitated by the nation’s political
chaos, the pervasiveness of economic stagnation, and the
endemic dissatisfaction of the population. In reviewing the
state of affairs in 1958, Gustav Papanek (1967: 6) states that
the new government &dquo;was sure of a long lease on political
life [and] was strong enough to carry out policies that of-
fended particular groups and were unpopular in the short run.&dquo;
Although Ayub sought to create a basis of legitimacy for
his seizure of power through a new constitution and a
popular election, the real basis of his support was mass
disenchantment with the old regime and the hopes his
leadership inspired. The takeover in 1958 was seen as a classic
case of military intervention by a modernizing military elite,
led and epitomized by General Ayub. At a minimum,
&dquo;military modernizers&dquo; are expected to effect orderly change
and manage the affairs of the nation in a way conducive to
modernization. The basis of legitimacy for Ayub, then,
depended upon what Lipset has called effectiveness, and the
meaning of effectiveness in most developing nations is
economic growth. 1 2
The new government under Ayub had no ready-made
development strategy, but it did possess sufficient political
strength to assure itself an opportunity to learn from its own
mistakes and identify domestic and foreign talent that might
enable it to energize the nation’s economy. &dquo;The govern-
ment,&dquo; in the words of Papanek (1967: 6), &dquo;made economic
policy a central concern, since it had justified its take-over
largely in terms of economic mismanagement by previous
governments.&dquo; In the candid language of one of the govern-
ment’s former chief economists, Mahbub-ul-Haq (1971: 2),
Pakistan
took the basic decision of devoting all the energies of the system
towards a faster pace of economic development and to forget
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about the issues of more equitable distribution or a more
democratic system of economic organization. The first priority
was growth; the other questions will come later.
If India’s development strategy could be described as more
or less politicized, then it is appropriate to describe Pakistan’s
as &dquo;depoliticized.&dquo; Pakistan was able to adopt a development
strategy that subordinated-if not ignored-questions of
social welfare, distribution, and equity to the primary
objective of rapid economic growth. This was possible
because the process of planning and economic policy
formulation did not occur in a political arena where
organized groups and political parties concerned about such
issues as distribution and equity had access or influence.
&dquo;The Planning Commission was isolated from the political
process-its only mandate being to devise policy for yet a
faster growth rate&dquo; (Haq, 1971). It would be more accurate
to postulate that planning was insulated from the free play of
group politics or from the democratic political process. If
large industrialists, landowners, and entrepreneurs did not
influence economic decisions and plans directly, it was
because they found those plans congenial to their interests or
they had access to other, less overt channels of influence (for
further analysis of Pakistan’s approach to economic develop-
ment and the role of the private sector, see a critical and
perceptive article by Nulty and Nulty, 1971 ).
THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE
FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS
Khalid B. Sayeed ( 1967: 102) has characterized Pakistan’s
political system under Ayub as a constitutional autocracy:
Ever since he seized power, he had consistently argued that
parliamentary democracy is not likely to work in Pakistan where
literacy is so low and where the people are not informed or
mature enough to use their votes to support certain national
policies or programs.
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As a consequence of Ayub’s low assessment of parliamentary
democracy and his power to translate his ideas into action,
Pakistan’s political system came to be comprised of a strong
executive, weak parliament, weak provinces vis-d-vis the
central government, a political order that muffled rather than
facilitated the articulation of political demands, and a
leadership committed to achieving national development
goals without great regard for ideological considerations or
popular sentiments.
Under the Ayub government, Pakistan adopted policies
and organized programs designed to accelerate economic
growth, and, in contrast to India at that time, selected the
type of industrial investment that has a much shorter
gestation period and a much lower capital-output ratio
(Mason, 1966: 6-7). As the Ayub government formulated its
policy for long-range economic growth, it took congnizance
of population factors. In 1959, Ayub had declared that &dquo;the
menace of over-population and rapid rate of population
increase exists in most underdeveloped countries, and a big
concentrated drive is necessary to educate the people about
the evils of overpopulation. &dquo;1 3 Within a few years, the
government considered population control an essential in-
gredient of its economic policy. Population control was
approached with the same determination and energy that
characterized Pakistan’s other economic programs.
With the active support of President Ayub, Pakistan’s
family planning program was vested with the power to bypass
or ignore many of the conventional political, administrative,
and social restraints that impede family planning programs in
other nations. The major responsibility of the family plan-
ning program in Pakistan has been managerial, a difficult
responsibility, yet one that is restricted largely to developing
an effective system to promote and deliver contraceptives to
potential adopters. It has been able to use its time, energy,
and resources to train personnel and to improve its logistics,
its supply system, and its evaluation system. The program has
[286]
had the authority of the President behind it, reinforced by
the considerable abilities of Pakistan’s planners and tech-
nicians, and it has had the power and authority to utilize
money as an additional incentive to government servants and
others to help advance the program.
India’s political leadership has not shown the same level of
support for family planning as evidenced by Ayub, partly
because economic growth, population control, and other
developmental programs in India are viewed as subordinate to
the larger efforts of nation-building.’ Population control in
India has neither the strong political constituency nor the
autocratic executive leadership which would be necessary to
give it the dynamism of Pakistan’s family planning program.
The Prime Minister of India occupies a weaker executive
position, parliamentary democracy is genuine, Indian federal-
ism provides its seventeen states with extensive powers
vis-A-vis the center, and the ability of the Indian government
to direct the nation is limited by political parties and
divergent groups which have been able to articulate their
demands within the political system.
The Indian political context has not permitted the family
planning program to confine itself to the delivery of service.
While the family planning program has certainly not ignored
this central role, the program has not been able to pursue it
with the single-mindedness of purpose of the Pakistani
program. It has been required to invest much of its time,
energy, and resources in winning over other authoritative
institutions within India. Program leaders in the central
government, first of all, must try to deal with reluctant states
headed by chief ministers, finance ministers, or health
ministers who do not necessarily attach a high priority to
family planning. The leaders of the Indian family planning
program have had to convince various voluntary associations,
regional groups, caste groups, economic interests, religious
groups, and professional organizations that the family plan-
ning program, and fertility control itself, would not under-
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mine their relative power, status, and economic position in
the society. For example, Pakistan has been able to use
young women to insert the IUD after a relatively brief
training period, a practice which has not evoked mass
opposition from Pakistan’s medical association. Pakistan’s
doctors do not have an independent medical association with
the organized strength of the Indian medical association, nor
would the Pakistan government be predisposed to respond to
their influence. The contrasting sensitivity of the Indian
government to significant groups within its own polity has
precluded the family planning program from violating the
professional norms of the medical profession by employing
paramedical personnel for similar roles.
The task of eliciting the cooperation and support of
authoritative institutions and state and local political leaders
has been made more difficult by the inherent lack of political
appeal family planning holds for politicians. In India, as in
most societies, the short-run, parochial political rewards of
family planning are negligible, and, in some cases, are
outweighed by the political risks and liabilities. Although
government investment in family planning programs in the
developing nations may have a higher cost-benefit ratio than
any other investment available to government, the benefits
from a national family planning program are long-range, hard
to demonstrate (except in statistical terms), and generally
devoid of the visible impact of a new bridge or road in a
community. A politician or an administrator has little
prospect of receiving acclaim from his constituents for
helping to prevent the birth of x number of Indian or
Pakistani children. Without inherent political appeal and
without being able to count on the continued and active
support of political leaders, Indian family planning adminis-
trators have had to devote organizational resources to gaining
the cooperation and support of governmental units and
groups rather than delivering services.
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THE ROLE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Foreign assistance has been an important component of
Indian and Pakistani development programs; compared to
India, however, Pakistan has enjoyed a favored status as a
recipient of foreign aid, especially from the United States.
Between 1966 and 1968, a typical period, Pakistan received
$480 million and India received $1,191 million in net official
receipts (nonmilitary) from bilateral and multilateral donors,
making them the two highest recipients in the world (OECD,
1970: 318). On a per capita basis, however, aid for the same
period totaled $3.96 for Pakistan as opposed to $2.32 for
India (OECD, 1970: 315).
Pakistan’s favored status was initially a consequence of the
country’s serious economic plight in the late 1950s, when
General Ayub assumed power. A large infusion of foreign aid
seemed essential to the country’s unity and stability. More-
over, Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policies under Ayub
were congenial to the United States. Unlike India, where
government controls and the public sector of the economy
were emphasized, Pakistan adopted policies that gave con-
siderable latitude and support to the private sector. Whereas,
in international relations, India adopted a policy of neu-
trality, Pakistan aligned itself with the United States and the
West and became an important member of CENTO and
SEATO. Later, Pakistan strengthened its credentials as a
recipient by demonstrating under Ayub a capacity to utilize
such assistance effectively. Pakistan, in contrast to India, was
highly receptive to the advice of donor nations and showed
little of the national sensitivity so much evident in India
where foreign advisers and experts were regarded as a
necessary form of external interference in Indian affairs.
Foreign aid has played a critical role in the Indian and
Pakistani population programs by providing financial and
technical inputs which have had the effect of freeing
domestic resources that might not otherwise have been as
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readily available for family planning purposes. The reason
foreign aid has had this effect, especially in the initial stages
of the two programs, is that organized efforts at limiting
population growth are largely untried and experimental. As
was pointed out earlier, even when family planning programs
are successful, the returns are delayed, invisible, and, in the
short range, of questionable political value. It is easier for a
nation, therefore, to employ foreign funds earmarked for
family planning as venture capital than to divert scarce
domestic resources from more conventional development
projects.
As with foreign aid generally, Pakistan’s family planning
program has been a proportionately greater beneficiary of
outside assistance. Despite a population roughly one-fourth
the size of India’s, Pakistan received $6.8 million from fiscal
1966 through fiscal 1968 for its family planning program
compared to $6.3 million for India’s, according to figures
compiled by Warren Robinson (1969: 147). Pakistan demon-
strated early that it was prepared to tackle the population
question with a level of energy and determination that was
absent in India and was more willing than India to take
advantage of the advice and skills of foreign technical
assistants. These factors in turn became a justification for the
greater interest shown by donor nations in the Pakistan
program.
CONCLUSION
In the period covered by this analysis, Pakistan was more
successful than India in pursuing economic development as
well as population control, but was the less successful of the
two in its political development. If India is susceptible to the
accusation that it has made too many concessions to politics,
Pakistan is even more vulnerable to the opposite accusation
that it has not been sensitive enough to the needs of the
political sector. Guided by the philosophy that economic
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growth is not only its own reward but is a nation’s long-range
guarantee of political stability, Pakistan ordered its political
life and its policies to maximize its capacity to generate and
sustain rapid economic growth. While the private sector was
given a free hand, the distribution crisis worsened; while
issues of economic location were resolved in an economically
&dquo;rational&dquo; fashion, geographical disparities were intensified;
while the classical model of subsidizing urban and industrial
development at the expense of the agricultural sector was
pursued, rural dissatisfaction grew; while entrepreneurship
was rewarded, the intelligentsia rebelled (see Nulty and
Nulty, 197 7 ). These were difficult policy decisions for Ayub
and his government, as the outcomes could clearly lead to the
loss of vital political support. Yet, with the encouragement of
both domestic and foreign economic advisers, Ayub opted
for economics at the expense of politics, a choice which
ultimately led to political collapse and a new cycle of
military intervention in Pakistan’s politics.’ 5
India, on the other hand, has shown considerable commit-
ment to Western parliamentary government as well as
ideological dedication to socialism and egalitarianism. Much
more indigenous to India has been its commitment to
conciliation and bargaining as a means of resolving internal
conflict. These characteristics are reflected in the country’s
competitive party system, the absence of military interven-
tion in politics, the continuation of a free press, the
constitutional as well as de facto strength of the states, and a
range of significant as well as symbolic policies adopted by
the government in every area of social life. While India has
not been economically stagnant, at no time has it shown the
political capacity or the will to go all-out for rapid economic
growth, especially if such growth would necessitate major
compromises for the political system.
The experiences and relative performance of India and
Pakistan in administering national family planning programs
are functionally related to each nation’s politics and develop-
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ment strategy. Considerable evidence has been presented in
this paper indicating that the properties of a nation’s political
system and its development policies are important determi-
nants of program performance. The combination of politics
and development strategy that may seem highly productive
for one field of development, however, may not be func-
tional for another field. For example, in contrast with family
planning, consider the impact of these factors on community
development, where India has been more successful than
Pakistan (see, e.g., Rahman, 1967).
Paradoxically, the strength of Pakistan’s family planning
program is closely associated with factors that have spelled
disruption and breakdown for Pakistan’s political develop-
ment. The comparative weakness of India’s effort to control
population growth is linked to the viability of its democratic
political institutions as well as to its less impressive perform-
ance in achieving more rapid economic growth during the
1960s.
NOTES
1. Earlier predictions of U.S. demographers had also underestimated the
degree of population growth (see Coale and Hoover, 1958). The reputation of
Coale and Hoover’s book is already well established as a seminal work in the field.
Simmons’ recent book is highly instructive not only for its analysis of the Indian
program, but also for its general treatment of family planning as a form of
economic investment in developing nations generally.
2. Although Lewis presents evidence limited to India, his information on this
point is equally applicable to Pakistan.
3. India had supplemented the conventional array of mechanical and
chemical contraceptives by making available in some areas both male and female
sterilization. Neither country offered the Pill through its govemment-sponsored
program because of concern over cost, side-effects, and the belief that the regimen
of the one-a-day Pill would not be followed by most women.
4. In 1969, when a team of experts from a United Nations evaluation
mission reviewed the Indian family planning program, they indicated that "the
optimistic view of the IUD generally prevailing at that time was largely
responsible for their [subsequent problems] not having been fully appreciated.
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Lack of an effective evaluation mechanism in the programme of promptly
analyzing such problems aggravated the difficulties" (United Nations, 1969a: 6).
5. Reports on several studies on age, parity, or IUD retention of family
planning adopters in India and Pakistan have appeared in Population Council
(1963-1970). See issues numbered 1, 8, 18, 31, 35, 39, 47, and 56. The judgment
attributed to "firsthand observers" is based on numerous discussions the author
has had with representatives and experts from the United States and international
agencies and universities.
6. In his analysis of Indian public administration, Appleby (1956) elaborates
on the stifling effect of the system’s bureaucratic controls.
7. Illustrative of some of the functions the Central Ministry of Health could
have performed were more regular high-level liaison with the states, with foreign
and international donor agencies, and with private and voluntary organizations
and associations throughout India who are potentially capable of contributing in
some way to India’s family planning effort. The family planning program
eventually did assign staff to assume some of these responsibilities; even then,
those assigned to these roles were not of sufficient status or high enough in the
system to carry out their responsibilities without referring an inordinate number
of questions to their administrative superiors.
8. This information is taken from a personal interview conducted with Dr.
Nafis Sadik, the Director General of the Pakistan Family Planning Council, in
Ann Arbor, Michigan, on May 18, 1971. Significantly, in the few states of India,
such as the Punjab and Madras, where similar responsibility was imposed upon the
deputy commissioner, the family planning program scored higher grades in terms
of IUD insertions and sterilization operations performed.
9. This information is also taken from an interview with Dr. Nafis Sadik.
10. The UN/WHO evaluation report on Pakistan pointed out that the
framework of the health services "reached only about 10% of the rural
population." The report also suggested that the underdeveloped health services of
Pakistan were one of the factors which induced the government to establish a
separate family planning organization (United Nations, 1969b: 43).
11. Although the thesis presented here attributes much of the success of
Pakistan’s program to administrative separation from the health services, the
combined UN/WHO evaluation mission was somewhat critical of this separation
(United Nations, 1969b: 47-50). The position of the UN/WHO mission reflects a
consistent view of WHO in favor of treating family planning as an integral aspect
of health.
12. Lipset (1960: 82) states that "prolonged effectiveness over a number of
generations may give legitimacy to a political system. In the modern world, such
effectiveness means primarily constant economic development." For an interest-
ing discussion of this question, see Ilchman and Uphoff (1969: esp. 111-114).
13. Indian leaders have often made similar pronouncements, but in my
judgment, Ayub was strongly committed to this position, as his subsequent
behavior indicated.
14. Simmons (1971: 183) concludes that despite the emphasis given to
population control in written statements emanating from the Indian Planning
Commission, the Commission actually attached low salience to population. He
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advances two fundamental reasons for the discrepancy between words and action:
"First, although per capita income has been indicated to be the major goal of
Indian economic planning, it seems likely that the major operational goal is total
national income. Second, the early plans were based on demographic and
economic models which did not leave any role for population policy." These
findings suggest additional reasons why Indian planning might have been more
easily diverted from population control as a result of political considerations.
15. At the outset of his study on the role of the military, Janowitz (1964: 1)
observes: "Those organizational and professional qualities which make it possible
for the military of a new nation to accumulate political power, and even to take
over political power, are the same as those which limit its ability to rule
effectively."
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